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Shareholder Voting in Mergers & Acquisitions: Evidence from the UK 
Abstract 
This paper examines the determinants and consequences of shareholder voting on 
mergers and acquisitions using a sample of resolutions approved by shareholders of UK 
publicly listed firms from 1997 to 2015. We find that dissent on M&A resolutions is 
negatively related to bidder announcement returns and positively related to shareholders’ 
general dissatisfaction towards the management. Shareholder dissent is an important 
predictor of the announcement returns of subsequent M&A deals. We also report an 
increase in shareholder dissent after the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
Keywords: shareholder voting, mergers and acquisitions, director remuneration 
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1. Introduction 
Shareholder empowerment is a key component of the recent corporate governance 
reforms (see e.g. Yermack 2010; European Commission 2014). Since the very need for 
governance is usually predicated on the potential conflict of interests between a firm’s 
management and its suppliers of capital (Tirole 2001), this may seem self-explanatory. 
The contrasting view is that shareholder empowerment is unlikely to generate effective 
participation among shareholders insofar as it fails to recognise the distinctive roles of 
managers and shareholders where managers make corporate decisions whilst 
shareholders can invest in numerous ventures within a diversified portfolio (Berle and 
Means 1932). In support of this position considerable empirical evidence suggests that, 
when empowered, most shareholders tend to back management decisions most of the time 
(e.g. Burch, Morgan, and Wolf 2004; Cai, Garner, and Walkling 2009; Iliev et al. 2015). 
Compared to voting on other corporate matters such as director remuneration 
(Conyon and Sadler 2010; Gregory-Smith, Thompson, and Wright 2014), director 
elections (Cai, Garner, and Walkling 2009; Ertimur, Ferri, and Oesch 2018), poison pill 
repeal and board declassification (Gordon and Pound 1993; Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe 
2012) shareholder empowerment in the form of voting on M&As is relatively less 
explored. Yet, perhaps no other corporate decision has the potential to damage 
shareholder value as much as embarking on an unsuccessful acquisition (see 
Alexandridis, Mavrovitis, and Travlos (2012) and Betzer, Doumet, and Goergen (2015) 
for reviews on value implications of M&As). Moreover, ever since Baumol (1959) 
acquisitions have been viewed as potential source of gains for size-motivated 
management at the expense of shareholders. 
In this paper, we study the determinants and consequences of shareholder voting 
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on M&A proposals of UK firms. The UK Listing Rules (LR 2015) require binding voting 
for all deals that have the potential to change the shareholders’ economic interests in the 
company’s assets or liabilities. This presents a unique setting to study voting on M&A 
resolutions. Voting on M&As in the US, the setting of most prior studies, is limited only 
to the fraction of deals that involves issuance of the acquirer’s equity by more than 20% 
of the outstanding common stock (Burch, Morgan, and Wolf 2004). Our sample of voting 
by UK shareholders therefore includes a more comprehensive selection of M&A deals 
subject to shareholder approval than previous studies. 
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is also the first study that utilises the 
detailed information on the number of votes cast to directly measure shareholder dissent 
on UK acquisitions. This allows us to document the level of shareholder dissent across 
deals and over time. A related paper, Becht, Polo, and Rossi (2016), documents that in 
the UK the average market reaction to announcements of deals that require voting is 
positive while the reaction to deals that do not require voting is negative. While this 
evidence supports the notion that mandatory voting on M&A proposals imposes a binding 
constraint on the acquirers’ management and discourages them from pursuing value-
destroying deals, it is silent on the variations in shareholder dissent and factors that may 
drive shareholders’ voting decisions. By using the number of vote cast This allows us to 
our paper documents and explains the variations in level of shareholder dissent across 
deals and over time. 
We attempt to explain shareholder voting against M&A proposals with their 
dissatisfaction with the proposed acquisitions and with the management in general. Given 
that the market reaction to M&A announcements reveals market-based valuation of the 
proposed deals and of acquirers as stand-alone (Grinblatt and Titman 2002; Hietala, 
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Kaplan, and Robinson 2003) and motivations behind the deals (Betzer, Doumet, and 
Goergen 2015), we argue that shareholders are more likely to dissent if the market 
announcement reaction is not in favour of the deal. We find that shareholder dissent on 
M&A resolutions decreases with the market announcement reactions during our period 
of study, 1997-2015. 
Voting against management initiated proposals is also considered as a governance 
mechanism for shareholders to express their concerns (Hillman et al. 2011) particularly 
where directors are perceived as inserting their power to extract excessive rents from 
shareholders (Fahlenbrach 2009). We propose that shareholders are more likely to dissent 
if they believe that directors set their own rewards beyond purely market-determined 
levels. We proxy shareholder discontent with the management with: i) the level of excess 
director compensation and ii) shareholder dissent on the director remuneration reports 
(DRRs) prior to the M&A dealproposalss. We find that shareholder dissent on M&A 
resolutions increases with the level of excess director remuneration and with prior dissent 
on DRRs. To the best of our knowledge, no prior study considers shareholder general 
satisfaction with the management or with the management compensation in the M&A 
voting context. 
We contribute to the growing strand of literature that evaluates the consequences 
of voting. The effectiveness of shareholder empowerment has been questioned given the 
low average level of shareholder dissent and the limited number of cases where voting 
has altered the outcome (Conyon and Sadler 2010; Iliev et al. 2015; Sauerwald, Van 
Oosterhout, and Van Essen 2016). However, disapproval expressed in director elections 
could be followed by immediate actions to avoid further embarrassment because of its 
reputational damage (Grundfest 1993). Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2009) report that 
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lower approval vote of director elections could lead to subsequent CEO turnover while 
Fischer et al. (2009) show that it could also lead to better value acquisitions and 
divestitures. Our results suggest that higher shareholder dissent leads to lower abnormal 
returns around the announcement of subsequent deals. This indicates that shareholder 
dissent does not seem to discipline managers to engage in better deals. Rather it serves as 
a source of information about the firm’s acquisition strategy and management ability for 
shareholders and prospective investors to use in their investment decisions. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the 
institutional background to shareholder voting regulations in the UK. We then provide a 
brief review of the current literature and develop the hypotheses. This is followed by the 
description of data, methodology and analysis of empirical results. Finally, we conclude 
by discussing the limitations of the study and provide recommendations for future 
research. 
 
2. Relevant literature and hypothesis development 
2.1. Institutional background 
The interests of managers and shareholders may conflict in the acquisition decisions: the 
former, whether motivated by the desire for size-related rewards (Murphy 1999), or 
hubris (Roll 1986), may be more tolerant of high-risk or ill-advised deals than those 
shareholders who stand to bear their consequences. There is an abundant literature 
documenting value-destroying acquisitions (Danbolt 1995; Moeller, Schlingemann, and 
Stulz 2005; Alexandridis, Mavrovitis, and Travlos 2012), not least because managers may 
be rewarded for completing deals (Harford and Li 2007) even where these ultimately 
prove unsuccessful. 
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In a reflection of this, many countries have introduced – or are considering 
implementing – changes in corporate laws to protect shareholders by requiring a binding 
shareholder vote on proposed acquisitions. In the US, shareholder approval is necessary 
for deals involving the expansion of the acquirer’s equity by more than 20% (Burch, 
Morgan, and Wolf 2004). Canada introduced a similar 25% threshold in 2009 (Ontario 
Securities Commission 2009). The EU proposed changes to the Shareholder Rights 
Directive to require shareholder voting on significant related-party transactions in 2014 
(European Commission 2014). Individual European countries, including Germany and 
France (Schult and Nikoleyczik 2012; Segain and Favier 2017) have also introduced 
directions on acquisition approval since the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. The 
Australian Stock Exchange began consulting on shareholder approval for selected 
takeovers in 2015 (Australian Stock Exchange 2015). 
Unlike other countries, the UK requires companies with premium listing, i.e. those 
meeting the UK’s highest standards of regulation and corporate governance, to call 
general meetings to approve deals that have the potential “to change the shareholders’ 
economic interests in the company's assets or liabilities” (LR 2015, p. 166). That is, all 
the larger acquisitions (Class 1 deals) and a substantial proportion of other deals, 
including reverse takeovers and related-party transactions, are required to be approved by 
binding shareholder voting at Extraordinary General Meetings (EGMs). The intention is 
to encourage shareholders, as owners, to ratify and monitor their agents’ decisions to 
protect themselves from self-interested managers (see Appendix A for a summary of the 
UK Listing Rules). This differs from the US and Canada where the requirement for 
shareholder approval for M&As depends on how a deal is financed. This means the 
shareholder approval requirement in the UK applies to significantly more variety of deals 
compared to other countries such as This differs from the US and Canada where the 
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requirement for shareholder approval for M&As depends on how a deal is financed.. 
Despite the institutional framework for shareholder empowerment, shareholder 
approval may confer unwelcome costs, which may lead to shareholders opt out of active 
participation. Unconvinced shareholders with liquid positions may prefer exit (Parrino, 
Sias, and  Starks 2003) whilst the majority vote with management. Empirical literature 
on ‘say-on-pay’ votes (Conyon and Sadler 2010; Ferri and Maber 2013; Gregory-Smith, 
Thompson, and Wright 2014) supports this as do the findings of Goergen and Renneboog 
(2001) that institutional investors tend to follow a passive strategy. Overturned 
resolutions or those with significant levels of dissent are typically restricted to particularly 
egregious or controversial decisions1. During our period of study, the average magnitude 
of shareholder dissatisfaction as measured by the percentage of dissent votes is small2. 
But even if passive acquiescence is the default position for shareholders facing decisions, 
their option of expressing dissent may remain a useful constraint. 
 
2.2. What determine shareholder dissent on M&A proposals? 
In the presence of separation of control and ownership in modern corporations, voting is 
a mechanism for shareholders to communicate their approval/disapproval of the firm’s 
management and governance. Voting might help improve governance structures and 
enable shareholders to realise the value destroyed by poor corporate governance 
structures (Bebchuk 2005). In the context of acquisition proposals, we assert that both 
discontent with the proposed acquisitions and a general dissatisfaction with the firm’s 
activities and performance affect the decision to vote against such proposals. 
In deciding whether to vote for or against a proposed M&A, shareholders need 
information on the wealth effects of such proposal. Given it is difficult and costly for 
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shareholders to acquire and/or verify information, undecided shareholders might find 
information entailed in the market reaction to M&A announcements, which are readily 
available, useful. A negative market reaction to the M&A announcement indicates that 
unconvinced shareholders prefer to vote with their feet while a positive reaction reveals 
that the market is in favour of the deal. 
The market reaction could also reveal information about the value of acquirers as 
stand-alone, i.e. a market re-assessment of the acquirer’s value (Grinblatt and Titman 
2002; Hietala, Kaplan, and Robinson 2003). Betzer, Doumet, and Goergen (2015) 
document that deals with positive market reaction to announcements, either accompanied 
by positive or negative long-run accounting performance, appear to have shareholder 
value increasing motives whereas deals with negative market reaction to announcements 
are motivated by acquirers’ stock overvaluation, or agency and/or hubris problems where 
managers invest in value-destroying acquisitions. Thus, the market reaction could provide 
information about the value of the acquirer and whether the management pursues self-
interest at the expense of shareholders. We, therefore, hypothesise that shareholders are 
more likely to dissent if the market, as reflected in the announcement reaction, is not in 
favour of the deal. 
Hypothesis 1: The level of dissent on M&A proposals decreases with the acquirer’ 
abnormal announcement return. 
 
Shareholders’ willingness to support or to dissent on a proposal may also depend 
on their general (dis)satisfaction with the management and governance structures. Voting 
against management-initiated proposals expresses governance concerns (McCahery, 
Sautner, and Starks 2016; Hillman et al. 2011) particularly over managerial entrenchment 
(Cai, Garner, and Walkling 2009; Iliev et al. 2015). Excessive pay is often associated with 
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weak governance structures where directors push their own rewards beyond purely 
market-determined levels (Fahlenbrach 2009; Gregory-Smith, Thompson, and Wright 
2014). Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2006) argue that the management’s ability to influence 
their pay not only imposes substantial costs on shareholders but also signals their power 
and the extent of their rent extraction. Here we posit that shareholders may consider 
signalling their discontent through votes on M&A proposals if they are unhappy with the 
excess rents captured by the management, particularly if they already express their view 
in a previous remuneration proposal. 
Hypothesis 2a: The level of dissent on M&A proposals increases with the level of 
excess director compensation of the acquirer. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: The level of dissent on M&A proposals increases with the level 
of shareholder dissent on director remuneration reports of the acquirer. 
 
2.3. Shareholder dissent and subsequent M&As 
Although voting is seen as the next best alternative means for securing shareholders’ 
claims on residual returns (Fama and Jensen 1983), voting against company resolutions 
may be a double-edged sword for unconvinced shareholders. Large negative votes 
arguably undermine executive authority and potentially destabilise management to the 
detriment of shareholder value (Gregory-Smith and Main 2014). This view appears to be 
supported by the low level of shareholder dissent recorded in the US and the UK (Burch, 
Morgan, and Wolf 2004; Conyon and Sadler 2010; Iliev et al. 2015). 
Despite the fact that voting against a proposal may not always bring the outcomes 
that dissident shareholders desire, such voting can be expressive (Sauerwald, Van 
Oosterhout, and Van Essen 2016) and lead to subsequent governance and leadership 
changes (e.g. Cai, Garner, and Walkling 2009; Fischer et al. 2009). Fischer et al. (2009) 
document that shareholder dissatisfaction as indicated in lower vote approval on director 
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elections could lead to fewer and better market-reaction acquisitions. In a similar vein, 
higher dissent on previous M&A proposals may impede managers from engaging in 
value-destructing deals, thus leading to better deals being proposed and consequently 
higher market reaction to deal announcements. 
However, one can argue that shareholder disapproval expressed via voting on 
M&A deals may sends a signal to the market, questioning the management’s ability to 
identify and negotiate value-creating deals, thus making external financiers reluctant to 
accept subsequent acquisitions. In this context, the market may not receive subsequent 
deals favourably if there is high dissent on previous proposals. These two competing 
effects may not be mutually exclusive and thus the net impact of previous dissent on 
subsequent M&As is ultimately an empirical question. Hence we propose two competing 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a: Higher dissent on the previous M&A proposal leads to higher 
acquirer’s announcement return on subsequent M&A deals. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Higher dissent on the previous M&A proposal leads to lower 
acquirer’s announcement return on subsequent M&A deals. 
 
3. Data and empirical methods 
3.1. Data sources 
To study the determinants and consequences of shareholder voting on M&A proposals 
we use a sample of M&A deals by UK listed firms during 1997-2015 that require 
shareholder approval. This includes Class 1, reverse and related-party deals as classified 
in the UK Listing Rules. Data on the deal characteristics were collected from Thomson 
One. Financial and accounting data of bidders are from Datastream. Data on CEO 
compensation from 1999 to 2015 were collected from BoardEx. Data on compensation 
from 1997 to 1999 were collected manually from annual reports. 
12 
 
Data on voting for M&A deals that took place from 1997 to 2009 were obtained 
from the proxy voting agency Manifest Ltd3. Data on voting for M&A deals that took 
place from 2009 to 2015 were hand collected. To do this, we first downloaded all M&A 
deals announced by UK listed firms between 2009 and 2015 from Thomson One. We 
then deleted deals for which financial, accounting data and deal characteristics were 
missing. Finally, we checked every deal for the requirement of approval with the 
Regulatory News Services (RNS), company websites, and business press. When approval 
was required we collected the votes of EGM meetings. Approval results of acquisitions 
from 1997 to 2009 were also manually checked with these sources. 
We require that for each M&A deal, data on company name, EGM date, resolution 
narrative, details of votes cast are available. Data on voting on directors’ remunerations 
resolutions were also obtained from Manifest for the period 1997-2009 and manually 
collected for the period 2009-2015. Our final sample consists of 362 M&A resolutions 
voted at the EGM of the acquiring company shareholders, including 309 Class 1 
acquisitions, 31 related-party acquisitions, and 22 reverse takeovers4. In our sample tThe 
minimum transaction value is £3 million, . Tthere are 15 ‘remaining interest’ deals and 
177 cross-border deals. 
To explore if deals that never reach an EGM and later are withdrawn are due to 
shareholder outrage, we downloaded withdrawn deals from Thomson One and examined 
news items and company websites. There are twelve such deals but only one was 
terminated because of shareholder outrage5. Other deals were withdrawn for reasons such 
as not agreeing with the target on a revised offer (7), losing to a rival firm (3), and not 
securing valid acceptances of target shares (1). Abnormal returns for these deals are not 
statistically significant from zero. 
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3.2. Empirical methods 
This paper seeks to explain shareholder dissent (Dissent), measured as the number of 
votes cast ‘against’ as a percentage of total number of votes cast, using the probit model 
due to the bounded nature of Dissent (Papke and Wooldridge 1996). To examine the 
impact of the market reaction to M&A announcements on dissent we measure CAR (-1; 
1) as the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns around announcement date using the event-
study methodology based on the market model. Here the market return is return on the 
FTSE All Share Index and the estimation period is 150 trading days (-180, -30) relative 
to the announcement. 
To study the influence of shareholders’ overall (dis)satisfaction with the 
management on shareholder voting on M&A proposals, we use two proxies: i) excess 
compensation Excess Total Comp6 and ii) shareholder dissent on previous director 
remuneration reports DissentDRR. 
We measure Excess Total Comp as the difference between observed and predicted 
CEO total compensation. The predicted value was obtained from the regression of CEO 
total compensation against its determinants together with year and industry controls as in 
(Core, Guay, and Larcker 2008; Feito-Ruiz and Renneboog 2017). CEO total 
compensation is the log of the sum of cash compensation and equity-linked compensation 
both measured in £000s at the fiscal year end prior to the announcement of M&As. 
DissentDRR is measured as the number of votes ‘against’ as a percentage of total 
votes cast on director remuneration reports prior to the M&A proposal. For example, the 
acquisition of Wilson Bowden plc by Barratt Developments plc announced on 5 February 
2007 was voted upon at the EGM held on 27 March 2007. We obtained the results of the 
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most recent AGM, which was held on 28 November 2006 to approve the remuneration 
report for the year ended 30 June 2006. We do not have data on DissentDRR for some of 
the deals prior to 2003 because approval of remuneration reports only became mandatory 
for firms incorporated under the UK company law from 2003 (Department of Trade and 
Industry 2002). 
We control for several firm characteristics that might affect shareholder dissent. 
Shareholder dissent might increase with Firm Size, measured as the natural logarithm of 
book value of sales, because management entrenchment in larger firms may be more 
severe (Masulis, Wang, and Xie 2007) and therefore deals by these firms may be deemed 
value destroying. Indeed, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find a negative 
relationship between firm size and announcement abnormal returns. They further find 
that larger firms pay higher premiums and make acquisitions that produce negative dollar 
synergies and explain this as the evidence of managerial hubris. However, higher 
shareholder dissatisfaction could be the result of more engagement between shareholders 
and management in larger companies, especially following the onset of the financial crisis 
(FRC 2013). We also control for other firm characteristics including Tobin’s q, ROA, cash 
reserves and leverage scaled by total assets (Cash/TA and Leverage). 
We also control for deal characteristics. Diversifying is measured as a dummy 
variable set to 1 if acquirer and target firms’ 2-digit SIC codes are different, 0 otherwise. 
Managers may want to run a larger diversified firm to have more prestige (Jensen 1986) 
and higher pay (Jensen and Murphy 1990) at the expense of shareholders. Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) and Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) find a negative 
relationship between diversifying acquisitions and shareholder value. Dissent therefore 
may be higher for diversifying deals. Cash-payment is measured as a dummy variable set 
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to 1 if a bid is financed by cash only, and 0 otherwise. Dissent could also be higher for 
deals that are financed by equity than by cash as the former result in the dilution of 
ownership (Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford 2004). Bethel and Gillan (2002), for example, 
find that shareholders do not support management pay-related proposals that lead to 
higher dilution. We also control for other deal characteristics including relative deal size, 
measured as the ratio of the deal size and bidder’s total asset (Rel.Size), and whether it is 
a friendly deal (Friendly) or aand cross-border deal (Cross-border) deal. 
We recognise that our estimation process may suffer from an endogeneity 
problem which, if present, could confound the results and yield biased and inconsistent 
estimates. Endogeneity may occur in our empirical analysis due to omitted variables that 
determine shareholder dissent on M&A resolutions and at the same time are correlated 
with the market reaction to deal announcements and/or shareholder general 
(dis)satisfaction with the management. One may argue that shareholders of firms 
possessing a strong corporate governance system that discourages their management from 
the pursuit of value-destroying acquisitions are less likely to dissent on an M&A 
resolution that the management puts forward and, moreover, the market will react more 
favourably to such deal. Strong corporate governance could also discourage the 
management from paying themselves excessively and therefore lower shareholder dissent 
on remuneration resolutions. To address this endogeneity concern, we control for several 
variables that are standard in the governance literature including the share ownership of 
the board and of the largest shareholder who is not a board member7, the number of 
directors on the board, the percentage of non-executive directors, the number of female 
directors and CEO age. Definition for all variables is in Appendix B. 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1.Shareholder voting on M&As and executive pay during 1997-2015 
Panel A of Table 1 presents the yearly distribution of M&A deals voted by acquirer 
shareholders, the average dissent on such deals, and the average AGM dissent on the 
DRRs prior to voting on M&A deals. The numbers of M&A and DRR approvals differ 
because approval of M&As is required for companies listed on LSE regardless the 
country of incorporation while approval of the DRRs is only required for firms 
incorporated in the UK. 
On average, the level of dissent on M&A deals is low throughout the entire period, 
especially compared to the level of dissent on DRRs (0.76% compared to 5.25%). 
Although no deal was blocked by shareholder dissent, twenty three deals (6% of the deals) 
received relatively high dissent, i.e. greater than 5%8. Intense public interest in ‘fat cat 
bosses’ pay’ and the UK government’s effort on curbing executive pay and narrowing the 
growing wage gap between bosses and workers (Financial Times 2017a, 2017b) could 
have encouraged higher dissent for DRR compared to M&A resolutions. 
Panel A also shows that there is a sharp increase in both dissent on M&As and 
DRRs following the dot.com bubble and the financial crisis. Panel B shows that the 
average M&A and DRR dissent in the post-crisis period is significantly higher than in the 
pre-crisis period. This is consistent with the proposition that the degree of discretion that 
shareholders leave to managers depends on the formers’ perception of the business 
environment (Gregory-Smith, Thompson, and Wright 2014). As financial markets 
witnessed an angry reaction to corporate scandals during the crisis (Yermack 2010), 
regulatory reforms, including those on M&A activities, have been implemented to protect 
shareholders’ interests. For example, the UK Stewardship Code was introduced in 2010 
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with the purpose of encouraging good governance practice by institutional investors (FRC 
2010). It was later reported that the level of engagement between investors and boards of 
UK listed companies has increased (FRC 2013). Engaging with the board to establish a 
dialogue may be seen as a precursor to more ‘aggressive activist’ strategies (Roberts 
2014). Panel C presents the dissent distribution by the twelve Fama-French industries.  
In Table 2, we report the dissent for completed and uncompleted deals (Panel A) 
and for deals with different time lapse between the deal announcements and the dates of 
the EGMs where the voting took place (Panel B). A very small fraction of deals were not 
completed (13 out of 362 announcements) and these have higher level of dissent on M&A 
resolutions and on the DRRs (although statistically insignificant). The reasons for 
withdrawal are losing to rival firms (4); rejection by target firms (3); issues with the 
competition committee (3), not reaching acceptance level of the offer (2); and the bidder 
being acquired itself (1). 
For nearly half of the deals (175 out of 362 announcements) the EGMs took place 
within one month from the deal announcement dates. These deals have higher level of 
shareholder approval than deals that took longer from the announcement date to the EGM, 
indicating that shareholders become more dissatisfied if it takes longer for a firm to 
organise the EGM to vote on the M&A resolution.  The average level of dissent in deals 
that take longer than three months for the voting to take place is about twice as much 
compared to deals where the voting takes place in less than one month from the 
announcement dates (0.52% compared to 1.11%). 
 
4.2. Market reaction to M&A announcements and shareholder voting 
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Table 3 reports the M&A abnormal announcement returns for bidders, measured as the 
difference between the realised return and the expected return using the standard event 
study methodology. Our sample is reduced to 350 because of insufficient share price data 
around the announcements for 12 deals. Panel A shows that, on average, the market 
reactions to the M&A announcements are positive and statistically significant in all three-
event windows. Panel B shows that the market reactions are higher in the post-crisis 
period than before and during crisis. 
Results of the probit regressions that explain cross-sectional variations in 
shareholder dissent are presented in Table 4. Due to missing values in some control 
variables the number of observations is reduced to 338. Models (1) to (4) are estimated 
with the full sample while models (5) to (8) are estimated with the sample of Class 1 
acquisitions only. In all models the marginal effect of CAR(-1;1) is negative and 
statistically significant. This result indicates that the higher the market evaluation of a 
deal the lower the shareholder dissent on the deal resolution, which provides strong 
support for our Hypothesis 1. 
As predicted, deals by large firms and diversifying deals are associated with 
higher shareholder dissent. This is consistent with the findings reported previously that 
these deals generally are value destroying (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1990; Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz 2004) and that shareholders are more likely to oppose the deals 
when managers enlarge firm scope at the expenses of shareholders (Berger and Ofek 
1995; Ataullah et al. 2014)9. Deals with all cash payment receive less dissent compared 
to deals that are financed with equity, which is consistent with Bethel and Gillan (2002) 
findings that shareholders do not support management proposals that lead to higher 
dilution of ownership. We introduce a dummy variable Post-crisis in models (2), (4), (6) 
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and (8) to control for the effect of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The marginal effect of 
Post-crisis is positive and statistically significant in all specifications. This suggests that 
shareholder dissent is higher in the post-crisis period, which is consistent with the results 
reported in Table 1. Lastly, shareholder dissent is positively related to board size and 
CEO age and negatively related to the number of female directors and the share ownership 
of the directors. 
 
4.3. Shareholder dissatisfaction and dissent on M&A proposals 
We next examine if shareholder dissatisfaction towards the management, as proxied by 
excess CEO compensation (Excess Total Comp) and dissent on DRRs (DissentDRR), 
influences voting on M&A resolutions. Table 5 reports excess CEO compensation of 
acquirers. Excess compensation in firms with higher than median (average) dissent on 
M&A proposals is higher than that of acquirers with lower dissent but the difference is 
not statistically significant. 
Table 6 presents the results of the probit regressions where we include excess 
compensation (Excess Total Comp) in models (1)-(4) and prior AGM DissentDRR in 
models (5)-(8) for the full sample. The sample size is reduced when we include 
DissentDRR because the approval of DRRs became mandatory only from 2003 and only 
for firms incorporated in the UK. The marginal effect of both Excess Total Comp and 
DissentDRR is positive and statistically significant in all models. This suggests that 
unhappy shareholders are willing to seize another opportunity to voice their governance 
concern about the management, particularly about entrenchment in the form of excess 
compensation at EGMs. Overall, our results provide supporting evidence for hypotheses 
2a and 2b. The impact of CAR(-1;1) and other variables remain similar to that in Table 4. 
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We repeat the above exercise with the sample of only Class 1 acquisitions and yield 
qualitatively similar results. 
 
4.4. Shareholder dissent and market reaction to subsequent M&As 
Panel A of Table 7 presents the number of M&A announcements one year after the voting. 
About half of the M&A deals are followed by the announcement of at least another deal 
and 23% of the deals are followed by two or more deals within one year after voting. We 
construct a sample of 253 first and second deals announced in the year following the 
voting of the original 362 deals. We divide the sample into two sub-samples, high- and 
low-dissented acquisitions based on the median and mean of the dissent on the original 
M&As. The average market reaction to these deals and the results for the difference in 
the means/medians test are presented in Panel B. The results suggest that acquirers who 
receive higher dissent in the original deals experience statistically significantly lower 
abnormal announcement returns for their subsequent M&A proposals. 
Regressions results of the impact of dissent on the original deals on the 
announcement returns of subsequent M&As are reported in Table 8. The negative 
coefficient of Dissent suggests that firms with higher dissent experience lower 
announcement abnormal returns on subsequent M&As. This is consistent with the non-
parametric results in Table 7 and supports our Hypothesis 3b. 
 
5. Robustness tests 
We carry out a battery of robustness check to ensure that theour reported results are not 
subject to our selected method of constructing the sample or variables. To address the 
concern that our results may be subject to measurement error in measuring shareholder 
dissent, we construct dissent in two alternative ways: i) Dissent2 as the number of votes 
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cast ‘against’ as a percentage of the total number of votes that could be cast based on 
voting rights10; and ii) High Dissent equal to 1 when Dissent used in the original 
regressions is higher than the mean value of Dissent, 0 otherwise. The results using these 
measures of dissent are reported in Table 9. We also use the median Dissent to distinguish 
between highly and low dissented deals and the results (not reported for brevity) do not 
differ. Overall, we find that the main results in Table 4 are robust to different measures 
of shareholder dissent. 
Next we use alternative measures of shareholder (dis)satisfaction: i) Excess Cash 
Comp and ii) Resid.DRR. We measure Excess Cash Comp in a similar fashion to Excess 
Total Comp using only the cash element of CEO compensation. Similar to Cai, Garner, 
and Walkling (2009), we apply a two-stage regression analysis: we first regress 
DissentDRR against all firm- specific variables in Table 4; we then take the residuals from 
this regression (Resid.DRR) and use them as an independent variable in the second stage 
of the regression. This is to address the potential problem of endogeneity: both voting 
decisions (on M&As and on DRRs) may be determined by the same factors because 
DissentDRR is potentially a function of some characteristics already included in the 
regression. Results reported in Table 10 are similar to results in Table 6 where we use 
Excess Total Comp and DissentDRR. 
 To address a potential problem of endogeneity in Table 8, we regress Dissent on 
its significant determinants found in Table 4 and use the residual dissent (Res.Dissent) 
from the regression to explain the announcement returns of subsequent M&As. The 
findings presented in Table 11 are not different to the results in Table 8. 
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6. Conclusion 
Findings presented in this paper are initial steps in our effort to understand what 
information shareholders in the UK take into account when casting votes on M&A 
resolutions and whether the votes are predictive of the valuation of subsequent M&A 
announcements. We show that shareholder dissent decreases with abnormal stock return 
at the announcement, suggesting that if the market sentiment to the deal is favourable 
then shareholders are less likely to vote against the deal. Shareholders also support 
acquisitions financed though cash, i.e. they are against equity-financed deals that will lead 
to ownership dilution. Shareholder dissent is higher on diversifying M&As and increases 
with bidder size. This is consistent with the evidence that (at least some) shareholders 
consider diversification to be a value-destroying strategy. More importantly, we find that 
shareholders already dissatisfied with their management, in particular with the 
management compensation will cast more votes against the M&A proposals and that 
acquirers with highly dissented deals receive lower abnormal announcement returns on 
their subsequent M&As. 
The changes in the regulations on M&A activities and corporate governance 
around the world have led to some developments in shareholder and investor activism in 
the post-crisis period. In the UK, it has been argued that the activism has gone beyond 
pure executive remuneration issues (Roberts 2014). Although there is a significant 
increase in dissent on M&As in the post-crisis period, our findings suggest that on average 
shareholders have rather been reluctant to vote against acquisitions. One limitation of this 
study is that we are unable to distinguish between individual and institutional voting. Are 
institutional shareholders any different to private shareholders in their voting patterns? 
Are they more likely to vote with their feet? Now, data on institutional voting is at best 
patchy as disclosure of voting outcomes by institutional investors is voluntary. However, 
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the Companies Act 2006 empowers the UK government to introduce regulations in the 
future that would allow more disclosure of institutional voting outcomes. When more data 
are available in the public domain, further insights into the voting on M&A process 
should be achievable. It is certainly an interesting area for future research. 
 
Table 1. Sample distribution 
Panel A: Number of deals and average dissent by year 
Year M&A (n=362) Dissent on M&As (%) DRR (n=200) Dissent on DRRs (%) 
1997 7 0.04 - - 
1998 14 0.53 - - 
1999 37 0.75 1 0.77 
2000 27 0.52 1 0.13 
2001 22 1.12 - - 
2002 20 0.98 5 4.15 
2003 25 0.40 14 3.60 
2004 25 0.21 25 5.81 
2005 25 0.61 23 5.15 
2006 28 0.59 25 7.21 
2007 30 0.58 26 2.80 
2008 16 0.33 14 1.77 
2009 11 2.17 6 4.62 
2010 10 1.34 6 5.98 
2011 14 1.43 12 8.24 
2012 10 0.50 8 4.39 
2013 10 0.41 8 12.11 
2014 19 2.13 17 4.45 
2015 12 0.39 9 7.40 
Average 19 0.76 12.5 5.25 
Median - 0.05 - 2.22 
Std.Dev - 3.65 - 8.61 
Panel B: Average dissent before and after crisis 
Resolution Pre-crisis (1997-2008) Post-crisis (2009-2015) t-statistics 
M&A (n=276/86) 0.60 1.30 t = -2.452*** 
DRR (n=134/66) 4.58 6.62 t = -1.665** 
Panel C: Average dissent by industry 
Industry Dissent on M&As (%) Industry Dissent on M&As (%) 
Telecommunications 1.84 Nondurables  0.65 
Utilities 1.42 Business Equipment 0.34 
Chemicals 1.16 Healthcare 0.28 
Money 1.09 Manufacturing 0.27 
Other 1.04 Shops 0.21 
Energy 0.90 Durables 0.06 
Notes: Panel A presents the yearly distribution of the number of M&A deals voted by acquirer shareholders and the 
level of dissent in percentage terms. It also reports dissent on the DRRs in the AGM prior to voting on M&A deals. 
Dissent is the ratio of number of votes ‘against’ divided by number of ‘turnout’ votes. Panel B reports the average 
dissent on M&A deals and DRRs in the pre- and post-crisis periods. Panel C reports the average dissent on M&A 
deals across Fama-French 12 industry groups. The average dissent ratios in the pre- and post-crisis periods in Panel 
B are compared using a one-tailed t-test. *, ** and *** denote that the post-crisis mean dissent is larger than the pre-
crisis dissent at statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Formatted Table
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Table 3. Cumulative abnormal returns for acquirers 
Panel A. Average abnormal returns 
Return Mean Std.Dev Min Median Max t-statistics 
AR (0) 0.015 0.069 -0.199 0.007 0.334 4.215*** 
CAR (-1; 1) 0.022 0.085 -0.294 0.019 0.340 4.901*** 
CAR (-2; 2) 0.024 0.093 -0.454 0.017 0.469 4.860*** 
CAR (-3; 3) 0.026 0.103 -0.411 0.016 0.548 4.722*** 
Panel B. Returns before and after crisis 
Return Pre-crisis(n=265) Post-crisis(n=85) t-statistics 
AR (0) 0.012 0.027 -1.743** 
CAR (-1; 1) 0.020 0.029 -0.816 
CAR (-2; 2) 0.021 0.036 -1.306* 
CAR (-3; 3) 0.022 0.038 -1.201 
Notes: Panel A reports abnormal returns for acquirers associated with the announcement of M&A deals. 
Panel B compares the difference in the means of abnormal returns before and after crisis. Significance 
is tested using a two-tailed t-test for the hypothesis that abnormal returns are different from zero in Panel 
A and a one-tailed t-test that the post crisis average abnormal returns are higher than the pre-crisis returns 
in Panel B. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Shareholder dissent by completion status and time to voting 
Panel A: Average dissent by acquisition completion status (362 deals) 
Resolution Completed Not completed 
M&A  0.748 1.135 
(Number of deals) (347) (15) 
DRR  5.125 8.040 
(Number of deals) (191) (9) 
Panel B: Average dissent by the interval between announcement and EGM (362 deals) 
Resolution < 1 month 1 to 3 months  > 3 months 
M&A   0.521 0.963** 1.108** 
(Number of deals) (175) (150) (37) 
DRR  5.211 5.109 6.012 
(Number of deals) (85) (92) (23) 
Notes: Panels A and B present the average dissent by acquisition completion status and the interval 
between M&A announcement and EGM date, respectively. Differences in means in both panels are tested 
by a one-tailed t-test. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4. Determinants of dissent on M&A resolutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
CAR (-1; 1) -0.042*** -0.034** -0.041** -0.033** -0.035** -0.032** -0.036** -0.032** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Firm Size 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.001* 0.002** 0.001 0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Diversifying 0.005* 0.005* 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005* 0.005** 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cash-payment -0.004* -0.005* -0.004* -0.005* -0.004* -0.005** -0.004* -0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
BoardOwn -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OwnConc 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Board Size 0.012** 0.012** 0.013** 0.013** 0.014*** 0.012** 0.014*** 0.011** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Non-Exec 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Gender -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEO Age 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.022** 0.019** 0.022** 0.020** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
ROA   0.005 0.005   0.005 0.003 
   (0.005) (0.006)   (0.005) (0.005) 
Tobin’s q   -0.001 -0.002   -0.001 -0.001 
   (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.000) 
Cash/TA   0.006 0.008   0.005 0.006 
   (0.009) (0.010)   (0.008) (0.009) 
Leverage   0.003 0.002   0.000 0.001 
   (0.006) (0.007)   (0.006) (0.007) 
Rel.Size   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
   (0.001) (0.000)   (0.001) (0.000) 
Friendly   0.001 0.002   0.001 -0.000 
   (0.003) (0.003)   (0.003) (0.003) 
Cross-border   0.001 0.001   0.002 0.003 
   (0.002) (0.003)   (0.003) (0.003) 
Post-crisis  0.010***  0.009***  0.009***  0.008** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
         
Year dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 338 338 334 334 298 298 295 295 
R-squared 0.328 0.243 0.349 0.282 0.345 0.253 0.376 0.313 
Notes: This table presents the results of probit regressions with Dissent on M&As as the dependent variable. The sample 
used in Models (1) to (4) includes 362 Class 1 acquisitions, reverse takeovers and related-party transactions. The sample 
used in Models (5) to (8) includes 302 Class 1 acquisitions. Marginal effects are reported. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Table 5. Excess CEO compensation by dissent on M&A proposals 
 Median Mean 
Dissent High (n=178) Low (n=178) High (n=52) Low (n=304) 
Excess Total Comp 20.316 -20.551 103.074 -17.294 
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Excess Cash Comp 15.441 -15.620 70.274 -11.791 
Notes: This table shows the average excess CEO compensation by the level of dissent on M&A proposals. 
Total compensation is the log of the sum of cash compensation and equity-linked compensation measured 
in £000s at the fiscal year end prior to the announcement of M&As. Cash compensation includes base 
salary, bonus, pension and other payments (e.g. benefits). Excess compensation is calculated as in Core, 
Guay, and Larcker (2008) and Feito-Ruiz and Renneboog (2017). Differences in means in both panels 
are tested by a two-tailed t-test. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
Table 6. Determinants of dissent on M&A resolutions: The impact of excess compensation and dissent on DRRs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Excess Total Comp 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003*     
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
DissentDRR     0.045** 0.024 0.042*** 0.024 
     (0.019) (0.020) (0.016) (0.019) 
CAR (-1; 1) -0.040*** -0.031** -0.039** -0.032** -0.030 -0.030 -0.025 -0.024 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) 
Firm Size 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Diversifying 0.005** 0.005* 0.005** 0.005** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cash-payment -0.004* -0.005* -0.004* -0.005* -0.007** -0.007** -0.006** -0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
BoardOwn -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OwnConc 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Board Size 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Non-Exec 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.015 0.015* 0.011 0.012 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Gender -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEO Age 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.010 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
ROA   0.004 0.005   0.001 -0.001 
   (0.005) (0.006)   (0.005) (0.005) 
Tobin’s q   -0.001 -0.002*   -0.001 0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) 
Cash/TA   0.003 0.004   0.017 0.014 
   (0.009) (0.009)   (0.012) (0.010) 
Leverage   0.004 0.003   0.011 0.007 
   (0.007) (0.007)   (0.008) (0.007) 
Rel.Size   0.000 0.000   0.002 0.003 
   (0.001) (0.000)   (0.003) (0.003) 
Friendly   0.000 0.001   -0.006* -0.005 
   (0.003) (0.003)   (0.004) (0.004) 
Cross-border   0.000 0.001   0.001 0.002 
   (0.002) (0.003)   (0.003) (0.004) 
Post-crisis  0.010***  0.009***  0.012***  0.013*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
         
Year dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 338 338 334 334 192 192 190 190 
R-squared 0.358 0.268 0.380 0.310 0.621 0.547 0.683 0.589 
Notes: This table presents the results of probit regressions with Dissent on M&As as the dependent variable. The sample 
used in all models includes 362 Class 1 acquisitions, reverse takeovers and related-party transactions. Marginal effects 
are reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 7. M&As announced following EGMs 
Panel A. Number of M&As within one year after EGM 
Number of M&As Year 1 after EGM 
1 170 
2 83 
3 37 
4 21 
5 12 
6 7 
7 4 
8 3 
9 3 
10 1 
Overall 341 
Panel B. Market reaction to post-vote M&A announcements 
 Median Mean 
Dissent High Low High Low 
CAR (-1; 1) 0.003 0.014** -0.002 0.011* 
CAR (-2; 2) 0.004 0.017** 0.002 0.012 
CAR (-3; 3) 0.003 0.019** -0.001 0.013* 
Notes: This table presents statistics of subsequent M&As following voting on M&A 
resolutions. Panel A shows the number of M&A deals announced in one year after the 
voting. Panel B compares the average market reactions to the subsequent M&A deals 
of low and highly dissented acquirers. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance of 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 8. Impact of shareholder dissent on market perceptions of subsequent M&A deals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Dissent -0.315*** -0.333*** -0.268** -0.292* -0.258** -0.245** -0.290* -0.217 
 (0.096) (0.122) (0.135) (0.164) (0.103) (0.109) (0.148) (0.197) 
CAR (-1; 1) -0.020 -0.046 -0.040 -0.049 -0.041 -0.064 -0.056 -0.048 
 (0.037) (0.044) (0.034) (0.035) (0.045) (0.047) (0.040) (0.036) 
Firm Size 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.005** 0.005* 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Diversifying -0.004 -0.010 0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.011 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
Cash-payment -0.004 -0.006 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.006 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008) 
BoardOwn 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OwnConc 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Board Size -0.001 -0.008 -0.009 -0.011 0.000 -0.011 -0.012 -0.018 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Non-Exec -0.039* -0.049** 0.001 0.002 -0.035 -0.038 0.008 0.015 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.030) (0.025) (0.025) (0.030) (0.035) 
Gender 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
CEO Age -0.062** -0.063*** -0.032 -0.037* -0.069** -0.068** -0.036 -0.040* 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) 
ROA  0.007  -0.017  -0.003  -0.008 
  (0.028)  (0.034)  (0.028)  (0.031) 
Tobin’s q  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Cash/TA  -0.066*  -0.036  -0.081**  -0.048 
  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.031)  (0.033) 
Leverage  0.020  0.005  0.022*  0.007 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Friendly  -0.000  -0.021  -0.025*  -0.041 
  (0.014)  (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.027) 
Cross-border  0.007  -0.005  0.007  -0.004 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Constant 0.231*** 0.276*** 0.104 0.169* 0.229** 0.284*** 0.088 0.161* 
 (0.087) (0.098) (0.082) (0.092) (0.098) (0.104) (0.091) (0.096) 
         
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 160 151 237 220 144 137 211 198 
R-squared 0.236 0.306 0.141 0.181 0.248 0.336 0.160 0.220 
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS regressions with CAR (-1; 1) as the dependent variable. The sample used 
in Models (1) to (4) includes 362 Class 1 acquisitions, reverse takeovers and related-party transactions. The sample 
used in Models (5) to (8) includes 302 Class 1 acquisitions. Regressions (1), (2), (5) and (6) use the first M&A within 
a year following the voting. Regressions (3), (4), (7) and (8) use first and second M&As within a year following the 
voting. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 9. Determinants of dissent on M&A resolutions: Alternative measures of Dissent 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
CAR (-1; 1) -0.021** -0.017* -0.853*** -0.742*** -0.019** -0.017* -0.957*** -0.825*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.223) (0.226) (0.009) (0.009) (0.251) (0.213) 
Firm Size 0.001** 0.001** 0.033** 0.030* 0.001 0.001* 0.015 0.017 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.015) 
Diversifying 0.003** 0.003* 0.056 0.048 0.003** 0.003** 0.042 0.037 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.035) (0.036) (0.001) (0.001) (0.040) (0.038) 
Cash-payment -0.003* -0.003** -0.054* -0.065* -0.003* -0.004** -0.073* -0.078** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.032) (0.036) (0.002) (0.002) (0.037) (0.037) 
BoardOwn -0.000* -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.006* -0.007 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.005) 
OwnConc -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.004* -0.004* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
Board Size 0.008** 0.007** 0.232*** 0.220*** 0.008** 0.006* 0.239** 0.204** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.086) (0.085) (0.003) (0.003) (0.096) (0.091) 
Non-Exec 0.004 0.005 0.238* 0.238* 0.002 0.004 0.205 0.227 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.128) (0.128) (0.004) (0.004) (0.135) (0.146) 
Gender -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.055** -0.050* -0.003*** -0.002** -0.062** -0.053* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.026) (0.027) (0.001) (0.001) (0.032) (0.028) 
CEO Age 0.009 0.007 0.109 0.125 0.013** 0.012** 0.407*** 0.331** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.127) (0.122) (0.006) (0.006) (0.138) (0.136) 
ROA 0.003 0.002 0.045 0.055 0.002 0.001 0.077 0.056 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.068) (0.072) (0.003) (0.003) (0.080) (0.083) 
Tobin’s q -0.001 -0.001 -0.008 -0.013 -0.000 -0.000 -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.006) 
Cash/TA 0.007 0.007 -0.025 -0.004 0.005 0.005 0.023 0.033 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.135) (0.151) (0.005) (0.005) (0.130) (0.151) 
Leverage 0.002 0.001 -0.048 -0.016 0.001 0.000 -0.067 -0.015 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.092) (0.084) (0.004) (0.005) (0.098) (0.085) 
Rel.Size 0.000 0.000 -0.005 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.023 -0.013 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.034) (0.029) 
Friendly 0.001 0.001 -0.068 -0.051 0.000 -0.000 0.045 0.014 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.051) (0.054) (0.002) (0.002) (0.058) (0.057) 
Cross-border 0.000 0.001 0.010 0.021 0.001 0.002 0.039 0.059 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.040) (0.041) (0.002) (0.002) (0.043) (0.042) 
Post-crisis  0.006**  0.063  0.006**  0.059 
  (0.002)  (0.045)  (0.003)  (0.048) 
         
Year dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 329 329 334 334 290 290 295 295 
R-squared 0.346 0.277 0.341 0.283 0.414 0.339 0.387 0.341 
Notes: This table presents the results of probit regressions with two alternatives measures of dissent on M&As. The 
dependent variable in (1), (2), (5) and (6) is Dissent2 measured as the number of votes ‘against’ as a percentage of the 
total number of votes that can be cast. The dependent variable in (3), (4), (7) and (8) is a dummy variable High Dissent 
equal to 1 when dissent is higher than mean Dissent, 0 otherwise. The sample used in Models (1) to (4) includes 362 
Class 1 acquisitions, reverse takeovers and related-party transactions. The sample used in Models (5) to (8) includes 302 
Class 1 acquisitions. Marginal effects are reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 10. Determinants of dissent on M&As: Alternative measures of shareholder dissatisfaction with management 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Excess Cash Comp 0.002* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003     
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)     
Resid.DRR     0.041** 0.032 0.039** 0.032 
     (0.018) (0.021) (0.015) (0.019) 
CAR (-1; 1) -0.040** -0.031** -0.040** -0.032** -0.029 -0.030 -0.023 -0.024 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Firm Size 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Diversifying 0.005* 0.005* 0.004** 0.004** 0.008** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cash-payment -0.004* -0.005* -0.004* -0.005* -0.005* -0.006** -0.004 -0.005* 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
BoardOwn -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OwnConc 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Board Size 0.013*** 0.013** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Non-Exec 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.015* 0.015* 0.012 0.012 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Gender -
0.005*** 
-
0.005*** 
-
0.005*** 
-
0.005*** 
-
0.006*** 
-
0.006*** 
-
0.005*** 
-
0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEO Age 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.008 0.011 0.009 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
ROA   0.005 0.005   0.001 -0.001 
   (0.005) (0.006)   (0.005) (0.005) 
Tobin’s q   -0.001 -0.002*   -0.001 -0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) 
Cash/TA   0.004 0.006   0.021** 0.015 
   (0.009) (0.009)   (0.010) (0.010) 
Leverage   0.004 0.004   0.012 0.007 
   (0.007) (0.007)   (0.008) (0.007) 
Rel.Size   0.000 0.000   0.001 0.003 
   (0.001) (0.000)   (0.003) (0.003) 
Friendly   0.001 0.002   -0.007* -0.006* 
   (0.003) (0.003)   (0.004) (0.003) 
Cross-border   0.000 0.001   0.001 0.002 
   (0.002) (0.003)   (0.003) (0.004) 
Post-crisis  0.010***  0.009***  0.011***  0.012*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
         
Year dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 338 338 334 334 187 187 185 185 
R-squared 0.357 0.276 0.380 0.319 0.592 0.522 0.680 0.577 
Notes: This table presents the results of probit regressions with Dissent on M&As as the dependent variable. The sample 
used in all models includes 362 Class 1 acquisitions, reverse takeovers and related-party transactions. Marginal effects 
are reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. 
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Table 11. Impact of shareholder dissent on market perceptions of subsequent M&A deals: Two stage regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Res.Dissent -0.281*** -0.299** -0.236* -0.261 -0.220** -0.209* -0.221* -0.184 
 (0.098) (0.127) (0.142) (0.174) (0.107) (0.120) (0.112) (0.222) 
CAR (-1; 1) -0.006 -0.032 -0.028 -0.037 -0.031 -0.055 -0.069 -0.041 
 (0.036) (0.044) (0.032) (0.035) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.036) 
Firm Size 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004* 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Diversifying -0.005 -0.011 0.000 -0.002 -0.005 -0.012 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) 
Cash-payment -0.004 -0.006 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.009 0.006 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) 
BoardOwn 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OwnConc 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Board Size -0.003 -0.010 -0.010 -0.013 -0.002 -0.013 -0.010 -0.020 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016) 
Non-Exec -0.039* -0.049** 0.001 0.002 -0.034 -0.037 0.006 0.015 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.030) (0.025) (0.025) (0.021) (0.035) 
Gender 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
CEO Age -0.064*** -0.066*** -0.035* -0.041* -0.071*** -0.070*** -0.040* -0.042* 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.021) (0.027) (0.026) (0.021) (0.024) 
ROA  0.007  -0.017  -0.003  -0.008 
  (0.028)  (0.034)  (0.028)  (0.030) 
Tobin’s q  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Cash/TA  -0.067*  -0.037  -0.083**  -0.050 
  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.032)  (0.033) 
Leverage  0.019  0.004  0.022*  0.007 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Friendly  0.000  -0.021  -0.025  -0.042 
  (0.014)  (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.027) 
Cross-border  0.007  -0.005  0.007  -0.004 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Constant 0.257*** 0.304*** 0.126 0.194** 0.248** 0.304*** 0.126 0.179* 
 (0.087) (0.098) (0.081) (0.090) (0.098) (0.104) (0.080) (0.094) 
         
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 160 151 237 220 144 137 211 198 
R-squared 0.228 0.299 0.137 0.177 0.248 0.333 0.102 0.218 
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS regressions with CAR (-1; 1) as the dependent variable. The sample used 
in Models (1) to (4) includes 362 Class 1 acquisitions, reverse takeovers and related-party transactions. The sample 
used in Models (5) to (8) includes 302 Class 1 acquisitions. Regressions (1), (2), (5) and (6) use the first M&A within 
a year following the voting. Regressions (3), (4), (7) and (8) use first and second M&As within a year following the 
voting. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Appendix A – UK Listing Rules 
In the UK Listing Rules (LR 2015) there are three cases where approval is mandatory: 
First, when a deal is large relative to the acquirer (LR 10). The comparison of size is made 
by using percentage ratios resulting from applying class test calculations to an acquisition. There 
are four class tests. The gross asset test – a ratio of the gross assets of the target and the acquirer. 
The profits test – a ratio of the profits (after deducting all charges except taxation) attributable to 
the assets of the target and the acquirer. The consideration test – a ratio of the consideration for 
the deal and the aggregate market value of all ordinary shares (excluding treasury shares) of the 
acquirer. The gross capital test – a ratio of the gross capital of the target and the acquirer. 
Shareholder approval is required for a Class 1 acquisition, which is a transaction where at least 
one class test percentage ratio is 25% or more. 
Second, reverse takeovers also need to be approved by shareholders (LR 5.6). The UK 
Listing Rules define a reverse takeover as a transaction where any class test percentage ratio is 
100% or more; or which in substance results in a fundamental change11 in the business or in a 
change in board or voting control of the issuer. This does not mean that reverse takeovers are 
Class 1 acquisitions. Circulars sent to shareholders explain the reason for why approval is 
required, i.e. the deal is a reverse takeover or a Class 1 acquisition. There is also a mandatory 
approval of reverse takeovers under Rule 14 of AIM Rules (2016). 
Third, acquirer firms announcing a related-party acquisition are also required to obtain 
shareholder approval. A related-party transaction is a transaction (any class test percentage ratio 
is above 5%) between a company and a related-party, where the related-party means a substantial 
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shareholder or director of the company, or a person who may exercise significant influence12 and 
an associate of these three. The related-party cannot vote (LR 11). 
 
 
 
Appendix B – Definition of variables 
 
Variables Definition 
Dissent The number of votes ‘against’ as a percentage of total votes cast on M&As 
Dissent2 The number of votes ‘against’ as a percentage of total votes that could be cast on 
M&As 
High Dissent Dummy variable set to 1 if Dissent is higher than the mean Dissent, 0 otherwise 
DissentDRR  The number of votes ‘against’ as a percentage of total votes cast on DRRs 
CAR (-1;1) The 3-day cumulative abnormal returns around transactions calculated using the event-
study methodology based on the market model. The market return used is the return 
on FTSE All Share Index. The estimation period used to calculate 𝛼 and 𝛽 parameters 
of the model is trading 150 days (-180, -30) relative to the announcement 
Firm Size Logarithm of book value of sales 
ROA The ratio of net income over book value of total assets 
Tobin’s q Market value of total assets divided by book value of total assets, where market value 
of total assets is calculated as book value of total assets minus book value of common 
equity plus market value of common equity 
Cash/Assets Cash and cash equivalents divided by book value of totals assets 
Leverage The ratio of total debt over book value of total assets 
Excess Total 
Comp 
Difference between observed CEO total compensation and predicted CEO total 
compensation (residual of the OLS regression of CEO total compensation against its 
economic, governance, and ownership determinants together with year and industry 
controls) as in Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008) and Feito-Ruiz and Renneboog (2017) 
Excess Cash 
Comp 
Difference between observed CEO cash compensation and predicted CEO cash 
compensation (residual of the OLS regression of CEO cash compensation against its 
economic, governance, and ownership determinants together with year and industry 
controls) as in Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008) and Feito-Ruiz and Renneboog (2017) 
BoardOwn Percentage of shares owned by the board of directors 
OwnConc The percentage ownership of the largest shareholder who is not a board member 
Board Size Log of the number of directors on the board 
Non-Exec Percentage of non-executive directors on the board 
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Gender Number of female directors on the board 
CEO Age Log of the age of the CEO at the financial year end 
Rel.Size Deal size divided by the market value of the acquirer 
Diversifying Dummy variable set to 1 if acquirer and target firms’ 2-digit SIC codes are different, 
0 otherwise 
Cash-payment Dummy variable set to 1 if a bid is financed by cash only, 0 otherwise  
Friendly Dummy variable set to 1 if a bid is friendly, 0 otherwise 
Cross-border Dummy variable set to 1 if a bid is cross-border, 0 otherwise 
Post-crisis Dummy variable set to 1 if voting takes place from 2009 onwards, 0 otherwise 
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1 Royal Bank of Scotland shareholders have overwhelmingly rejected (90.42% against) the bank’s 
remuneration report because of £703,000 pension payment to outgoing CEO Fred Goodwin alongside the 
bank’s £40 bn. loss. It is the lowest vote in favour of a remuneration report in the UK corporate history, 
according to Manifest, a voting adviser (Financial Times 2009). See Gregory-Smith, Thompson, and 
Wright (2014) for more examples. 
 
2 In our sample the resolution that received the highest level of dissent, 19.7%, is the related-party 
acquisition of Prodeco Businesses by Xstrata from Glencore announced on 29 January 2009. Eight deals 
received significant shareholder backlash, i.e. more than 10% dissent (Manifest 2009). 
 
3 Manifest Ltd is a UK-based proxy voting agency that provides corporate governance and proxy voting 
services and data for institutional investors, company advisors and academics. Some of the studies that have 
used data from Manifest are Conyon and Sadler (2010), Gregory-Smith, Thompson, and Wright (2014), 
Stathopoulos and Voulgaris (2016). 
 
4 For deals for which we do not have data on the number of votes, there is only one deal blocked by 
shareholders on EGM. It is a Class 1 acquisition of Innicor Subsurface Technologies by Sondex plc 
announced on 21 September 2006. However, the deal was blocked because the board of directors of Sondex 
has determined to amend its recommendation and strongly advised that shareholders vote against the deal. 
As the company reported, this was because of the poor third quarter financial results of Innicor and certain 
other factors. In all other cases, managers’ recommendations are in favour of the proposed acquisitions. 
 
5 G4S plc, which announced a reverse takeover of ISS A/S on 17 October 2011, received negative market 
reaction of -21.6%/-10.4% as measured by AR/CAR(-1;1). Despite the negative returns, the board of 
directors decided to carry on with the deal. Later, they reported that after consulting with their shareholders 
to listen carefully to concerns regarding the acquisition and they concluded that it was inappropriate to 
proceed. 
 
6 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting using excess compensation in explaining Hypothesis 2. 
 
7 We replace OwnConc, measured as the percentage ownership of the largest shareholder who is not a board 
member, with OwnConc2 as an alternative measure of ownership concentration in all regressions. 
OwnConc2 is measured as the ratio of the sum of shares held by large shareholders (shareholdings 
exceeding 3% cut-off level are disclosed in annual reports). We find no difference in the results. 
 
8 According to Manifest (2009), “dissent level of greater than 5% should be cause for concern for a 
company and 10% would constitute what the press would be apt to call a shareholder backlash”. The deal 
with the highest dissent (19.7%) is the related-party acquisition of Prodeco Businesses by Xstrata from 
Glencore announced on 29 January 2009. Since Glencore was a substantial shareholder of Xstrata only 
independent shareholders were allowed to vote. Shareholders revolted against a preferential treatment given 
to Glencore in the form of a call option to buy the business back after one year and voted against the deal 
(The Guardian, 2009). The second deal with the highest dissent (17.6%) is a Class 1 acquisition of the 
Trafford Centre Group owned by Peel Holdings by CSC Group announced on 25 November 2010. Simon 
Property Group and a group of investors thought that an all-share deal with Peel Holdings, which is 
controlled by tycoon John Whittaker, would give him too much control in the company after completion 
(The Telegraph, 2011). Nonetheless, the two deals were approved. 
 
9 There is however evidence in the extant literature which contradicts the argument that diversification is 
always value destroying (see e.g. Ataullah et al. 2014). 
 
10 For the few firms from 1997 to 2015 for which there is no data on the total number of voting rights we 
collect the number of ordinary shares from annual reports, assuming ‘one share one vote’ standard, and use 
it as the total number of votes that could be cast. 
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11 The FCA considers that the following factors are indicators of a fundamental change: (1) the extent to 
which the transaction will change the strategic direction or nature of its business; or (2) whether its business 
will be part of a different industry sector following the completion of the transaction; or (3) whether its 
business will deal with fundamentally different suppliers and end users (LR, p. 20). 
 
12 In relation to a listed company, a person or entity which exercises significant influence over that listed 
company (LR, Appendix 1, p. 15). 
 
 
 
